Fair tax evasion by Cappelen, Alexander W. et al.
 1 
Fair Tax Evasion 
 
 
By 
Erling Barth 
Alexander W. Cappelen 
Tone Ognedal 
 
Discussion Paper 7/2006 
Abstract 
In this paper we analyse how fairness considerations, in particular considerations of just 
income distribution, affect whether or not people believe tax evasion can be justified and their 
willingness to engage in tax evasion. Using data from the Norwegian “Hidden Labour Market 
Survey” we show that individuals with low wages or long working hours, individuals that are 
treated unfairly by most tax systems, have a higher probability of justifying tax evasion. The 
same individuals are also more willing to take home income without reporting it to the tax 
authorities. These results are consistent with a model in which individuals make a trade-off 
between economic gains and fairness considerations when they make decisions about tax 
evasion. Taken together our results suggest that considerations of fair income distribution are 
important for the analysis of tax evasion. 
 
JEL Classification Codes:  D63, H26. 
Keywords: Tax evasion; redistributive taxation; fair income distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erling Barth, Insitute for Social Research and Department of Economics, University of Oslo. 
Alexander W. Cappelen, The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. 
Corresponding author: Tone Ognedal, Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Pb1095 
Blindern, 0317 Oslo, Phone 22 85 51 31, Fax 22 85 50 35, e-mail:tone.ognedal@econ.uio.no 
We are grateful to Agnar Sandmo for valuable comments. 
 2 
 
1. Introduction 
Most people feel the need to be able to justify their actions to themselves and to others. This is 
also the case when they decide whether or not to abide by a particular law. It easier to violate 
a law that one believes is unfair than a law that one believes is fair. In this paper we analyse 
how fairness considerations affect whether or not people believe tax evasion can be justified 
and their willingness to engage in tax evasion. The idea that tax evasion may be affected by 
what the taxpayers perceive to be unfair taxation is not original. For example, Bordignon 
(1993) presents a theoretical framework where taxpayers are more inclined to evade taxes if 
they have to pay a tax rate that is higher than what they think is a fair price for the public 
goods they receive. Fairness effects in tax evasion are also demonstrated in several 
experimental studies, such as Fortin, Lacroix and Villeval (2004) and Spicer and Becker 
(1980). In the present paper we focus on redistributive taxation. In particular we study how 
considerations of just income distribution might affect people’s propensity to justify tax 
evasion and thus their willingness to evade taxes.  
 
It is natural to meet attempts to justify tax evasion with scepticism and ask whether it is just a 
way to rationalize behaviour determined by other types of considerations, such as the 
expected net economic gain from tax evasion. It is therefore important to distinguish between 
rationalization and justification. A person is able to justify her behaviour if she can argue that 
her behaviour is in line with her norms and if these norms are formed independent of her 
behaviour. An individual’s ability to justify tax evasion will depend on the situation she is in, 
i.e. she will only be able to justify tax evasion if she is actually treated unfairly according to 
her own norms. People’s ability to rationalize their behaviour is not limited in the same way. 
A creative person may always be able to find some rationale for tax evasion. An important 
question addressed in this paper is whether people feel a need to genuinely justify their 
behaviour or if they simply rationalize. The best way to analyse this question is to analyse 
whether people who are actually treated unfairly by the tax system are more willing to accept 
unregistered work and more likely to say that tax evasion can be justified.  
 
The obvious problem with such an approach is the inherent difficulty in identifying those who 
are actually treated unfairly by the tax system. However, we shall argue that it is possible to 
identify certain groups of individuals that most people would agree are treated unfairly by a 
progressive tax system. Using data from the Norwegian “Hidden Labour Market Survey” 
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conducted in 2003, we show that a large majority of the respondents agree to principles of 
justice that, taken together, imply that a specific group of tax payers is treated unfairly by the 
tax system. This is the group of individuals who have low hourly wages and work long hours. 
Under a progressive tax system individuals in this group are taxed heavily even if their 
income opportunities are limited. Consequently, it can be argued that they are treated unfairly 
by the tax system.  
 
In the empirical parts of this paper we show that among individuals with identical monthly 
wages, an individual with low wages and long working hours is more likely to justify tax 
evasion than an individual with high wages and shorter working hours. We also show that the 
individual with low wages and long working hours is more willing to take home income 
without reporting it to the tax authorities. These results are consistent with our theoretical 
model. The results also turn out to be robust to the inclusion of measures of human capital, 
measures of marginal tax and to the inclusion of norms related to tax evasion as well as the 
expected probability of being caught.   
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we argue that the idea of giving all 
individuals equal income opportunities have strong support as a distributive ideal. This ideal 
implies that we should eliminate income inequalities that arise from factors outside individual 
control, but accept income inequalities that are a result of choices. In section 3 we derive the 
conditions for unfair taxation, given this ideal of distributive justice. Our main hypothesis is 
that people who are unfairly taxed are more likely to believe that tax evasion can be justified. 
Section 4 uses data from the “Hidden Labour Market Survey” in Norway to test this 
hypothesis. In section 5 we analyse, how the ability to justify tax evasion is likely to affect 
people’s willingness to evade taxes. We use a modified version of a model used by Sandmo 
(1981). The predictions are tested in section 6, using the same survey data as in section 4. In 
the final section we conclude. 
 
2. Just income distribution and equal income opportunities 
In the theoretical literature on just income distribution, the dominating contemporary view is 
that with equal opportunities and respect for personal freedom, people should be held 
responsible for their accomplishments. The revival of these liberal egalitarian ideas can be 
traced back to the seminal work by Rawls (1971) and has been developed further, by Dworkin 
(1981), Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998), Fleurbaey (1995a,b,c) 
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and Cappelen and Tungodden (2003). Liberal egalitarians argue that society should eliminate 
inequalities arising from factors beyond individual control, but consider inequalities arising 
from factors within individual control as legitimate. Factors beyond a person’s control are 
often thought of as race, educational background, social environment and natural talent. For 
convenience we shall refer to these factors simply as talent. Our notion of factors within a 
person’s control is fuzzier, but an individual’s free and informed choices are generally 
considered to be under her control. Despite the inherent difficulties in drawing the line 
between these two types of factors, any modern society makes judgments about the extent to 
which a person is responsible for certain factors. A liberal egalitarian approach can be seen as 
consisting of two parts: The first part is the principle of responsibility, which states that 
people should be held accountable for their choices. The second part is the principle of 
equalization, which states that individuals making the same choices are entitled to the same 
outcomes. 
 
 A liberal egalitarian approach seems to be in line with moral intuitions present in most 
modern societies. By way of illustration, in the “Hidden Labour Market Survey” the statement 
that we should accept inequalities due to personal choices gained the support of 87 percent of 
respondents. Equally interesting, 88 percent of respondents supported the claim that people 
exercising the same labour effort should receive the same income, and close to half of the 
sample (48 percent) supported the claim that inequalities due to factors beyond a person’s 
control should be eliminated. In contrast, only 12 percent of respondents supported the claim 
that income should be distributed on the basis of needs. The two principles underlying the 
liberal egalitarian view thus seem to have broad support among the respondents in the survey.   
This result corresponds well with other surveys of attitudes to welfare policies. Bowles and 
Gintis (2000, p. 47) conclude that “...egalitarian policies that reward people independent of 
whether and how much they contribute to society are considered unfair and are not supported, 
even if the intended recipients are otherwise worthy of support.”  
 
What are the implications of these two liberal egalitarian principles for redistributive policies? 
If all income differences were caused either only by differences in talent or only by 
differences in choices (for example of work effort) the answer to this would be simple. In the 
first case we would ideally eliminate all income inequalities and in the second case there 
would be no redistribution of income at all. However, both types of factors will typically be 
present: Inequality in income will partly be explained by differences in talent and partly by 
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differences in the choices made by the individuals. In such situations we would ideally want 
to eliminate only the first type of inequality, i.e., secure that all individuals have the same 
income opportunities. 
 
To illustrate, let us assume that a person’s hourly wage reflect that person’s talent. The 
principle of equalization then implies that one should eliminate differences in income due to 
differences in hourly wages. All individuals should thus ideally face the same hourly wage. 
Let us furthermore assume that people are free to choose the number of hours they want to 
work. In this situation the principle of responsibility implies that we should accept inequalities 
due to differences in working hours. For a liberal egalitarian, the fair income distribution is 
then to distribute total income in proportion to people’s effort. Konow (2000) has described 
this distribution rule as the principle of accountability.  
 
It is, however, inherently difficult to design a tax system so as to equalize income 
opportunities, because it would require information about the number of hours each individual 
has worked. It would be too easy to manipulate such a tax system by pretending to work more 
hours than one actually does. Consequently, most tax systems are based on total income. As a 
result, an individual with unfavourable opportunities (low hourly wage) but high work effort 
(many hours worked) might pay a higher fraction of his income in taxes than an individual 
with favourable opportunities (high hourly wage) but low work effort (few hours worked). A 
progressive tax system will redistribute income from the high talented to the low talented, but 
also from those who work hard to those who do not. In the example above, a progressive tax 
system will in other words redistribute from those with high hourly wages to those with low 
hourly wages, but also from those who work many hours to those who have more leisure. 
Hence, by trying to reduce one type of unfairness, the government actually creates another 
type of unfairness.  
 
3. The justifiable tax evasion 
The inherent limitations in the tax system imply that we are unable to create a perfectly just 
tax system even if everyone agreed to what constituted a just distribution of income. This 
insight is important in order to understand people’s beliefs about the legitimacy of the tax 
system, and thereby their attitudes towards tax evasion 
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The idea that the tax system might be unjust is of course no new idea. Protests against 
unreasonable and unfair taxation have a long tradition, and historically such protests have had 
important political consequences. Both the French revolution and the American independence 
war were partly triggered by tax systems that were considered unfair. In France, an increasing 
fraction of the population was exempt from paying taxes, and the American colonies people 
was enraged by the perceived injustice of taxation without representation (Adams, 1993). Tax 
evasion may in other words be considered as legitimate in some situation, although it is 
illegal.  
 
Our hypothesis is that since any tax system inevitably treats some individuals unfairly, these 
individuals will be more likely to believe that tax evasion can be justified. To see this, let li 
denote hours worked and wi hourly wage for taxpayer i. As mentioned above, we assume that 
the hourly wage reflects talent only. In real life, of course, wages do reflect choices as well, 
for instance through the accumulation of human capital. In the following, the wage measure 
should thus be thought of as a residual wage after having swept out effects of human capital 
accumulation.  
 
According to the principle of accountability, a person i’s fair income Yi* is given by 
 
  *
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where n is the number of individuals in the economy. Let y  be the average income in the 
economy, and l  the average number of work hours. The fair hourly wage, w*, can then be 
written as   
 
*
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i
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w
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i.e. the fair wage equals the average wage rate in the economy. 
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To represent a progressive tax system in the simplest possible way, we use a tax function with 
a constant tax rate t and a uniform transfer B. Hence, the total net tax payment for i is    
 
i iT ty B= -   (3) 
 
With a positive transfer B, the average effective tax rate is increasing in yi, i.e. the tax system 
is progressive. To focus on the problem of designing a fair tax system, we assume that the 
only purpose of the tax system is to redistribute income. There is no public good that needs to 
be financed. Consequently, net tax payments must equal net transfers, i.e. 
 
t y B=   (4)
   
By inserting *y w l= into (4), we obtain *B tw l= , and we can rewrite the net tax payment of 
taxpayer i as  
 
*( ) ( )i i i iT t y y t w l w l= - = -   (5) 
 
Fair taxes, according to the liberal egalitarian norm, should give each taxpayer i his fair 
income *i iw l . With pre-tax income equal to wili, the fair net tax payment, Ti
*, is simply the 
difference between the pre-tax income and the fair income, i.e. 
 
( )* *i i iT w w l= -   (6) 
 
It follows from Equation (6) that the fair tax not only depends on the taxpayer’s income, but 
also on his number of hours worked. The problem is that the tax system is unable to use 
information about the number of hours a person has worked. Taxes are therefore based on 
total income, and do not distinguish between individuals who have the same income, but who 
have worked different number of hours. Moreover, under a progressive tax system, people 
with the same wage rate, but who work different number of hours, will have different 
effective tax rates, since the effective tax rate, /i i iT w l , goes up when the number of hours 
worked goes up. This implies that attempts to redistribute income between individuals with 
different hourly wages will necessarily result in redistribution between individuals with the 
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same hourly wage, but with different labour effort. As a consequence, there is no feasible tax 
system that secures everyone a fair income in the liberal egalitarian sense, even if everyone 
agrees that the principle of accountability describes the fair income distribution. 
 
We assume that an individual’s ability to justify tax evasion depends on the size of the unfair 
tax payment, *ii TT - , relative to their income iwl . We call this relation the unfair tax rate.  
This implies that an unfair tax payment of 1000 dollar for an individual with an income of 20 
000 dollar is as unfair as an unfair tax payment of 10.000 dollar for an individual with an 
income of 200 000 dollar. The unfair tax rate, denoted l*, is given by   
 
*
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º =         (7) 
 
It follows from Equation (7) that while the unfair tax rate may be positive or negative, it is 
strictly increasing in the number of hours worked and strictly decreasing in the wage rate for 
10 << t . The intuition behind this result is important: In any linear tax system that sets the 
rate between zero and unity, there will be two types of injustices. First, because the tax rate is 
less than unity, the tax system will treat those with a high wage rate better than those with a 
low tax rate for a given number of hours worked. Second, because the tax rate is higher than 
zero, the tax system will treat those who work many hours unfair compared to those who 
work few hours for a given wage rate. 
 
 
We assume an individual is able to justify tax evasion as long as the fraction evaded does not 
exceed the unfair tax rate. The tax evasion that an individual finds justifiable, hereafter called 
the fair tax evasion, is thus equal to the unfair tax rate, l*, as given by (7). It follows from (7) 
that if *(1 ) it w w- > , the unfair tax rate l
* is negative for any number of hour’s work. 
Consequently, tax evasion is never justifiable if *(1 ) it w w- > . The negative l
* can then be 
interpreted as a moral cost of evading taxes. Since the unfair tax rate becomes less negative 
the higher the number of hours worked, the moral cost is reduced. If *(1 ) it w w- < , tax 
evasion is justifiable if the number of work hours is sufficiently large. More precisely, by 
inserting *B tw l=  we find that tax evasion is justifiable if 
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i.e., if his number of work hours is above a critical level il% . It follows from inspection of (8) 
that il%  is increasing in wi/w*,1 i.e. the number of work hours that makes evasion justifiable is 
higher the higher the wage rate.  
 
Similarly, tax evasion is justifiable if a person’s wage rate is below a critical value,  
 
_
*
(1 )
i
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l t l
w w w
t l
-
< º
-
  (9) 
 
The critical value is increasing in the tax rate and decreasing in the number of hours worked. 
 
To summarize, our hypothesis is that those who pay more than their fair tax can more easily 
justify that they evade taxes than those who pay less than their fair tax. More precisely we 
expect that the belief that tax evasion can be justified should be more prevalent among those 
who work long hours and among those with a low wage.  
 
 
 
4. Empirical analysis of the propensity to justify tax evasion 
 
The model above predicts that the propensity to justify tax evasion is increasing in the number 
of hours worked. We now test this prediction using data from ”The Hidden Labour Market 
Survey” from 2003. The survey was designed by the Frisch centre for economic research, and 
                                                 
1 Moreover, it is easy to show that il% is increasing in t if wi<w*, but decreasing in t if wi>w*. The reason is the 
following: An increase in t makes the tax function tyi+B more progressive. Since ty=B, B is increased when t is 
increased, and the average tax rate is a steeper function of yi the higher B is. A simultaneous increase in t and B 
makes the tax payment more fair for individuals with a wage rate below the fair one, i.e. with wi<w. 
Consequently, the number of hours that make tax evasion justifiable becomes higher for this group. The opposite 
is the case for individuals with a wage rate above the fair one.  
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undertaken as a postal survey by the Markeds og Mediainstituttet A/S. 1062 individuals where 
interviewed. For our analysis we have selected a sample of 532 individuals who are of the age 
18-64 and wage earners, working at least 20 hours in regular employment the week before the 
survey. The main question we use as our dependent variable is the following: 
 
Can tax evasion be justified? 
 
The alternatives were yes, no and do not know. Of the 1042 valid answers to this question, 
162 (16%) answered yes, 720 (69%) answered no, while the remaining 160 (15%) answered 
do not know. In our sample of 545 individuals, the answers where distributed as follows: 
 
Table 1. Distribution of answers to the justification question. Wage earners.  
 
Yes   96 (18%) 
No  364(68%) 
Don’t know  72 (13%) 
N  532 
 
A dummy variable was constructed, taking the value of 1 if the individual answered YES . 
Working hours is reported in categories only. In our sample, the intervals are 20-29, 30-39, 
40-49, 50-59 and 60 hours and more. A continuous variable is constructed, taking the values 
25, 35, 45, 55 and 65 accordingly.  
 
4.1. The relationship between justification and working hours  
Table 2 reports the average values of justification for the different intervals of working hours. 
Regular weekly working hours in Norway are 37,5 hours per week. As predicted by our 
model, we find an increasing tendency to justify tax evasion as the number of working hours 
increases.2  
 
Table 2. The average level of justification by working hour category. Wage earners. 
Average value of dummy variable for justification 
                                                 
2 At least, the pattern holds up to a level of 50 hours per week. The number of observations in the last two groups 
is very small, only 19 and 6 individuals, so we cannot put much weight on these observations.  
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Working hours Number of observations Average level of justification 
20-29 44 11.4 
30-39 364 15.1 
40-49 99 31.3 
50-59 19 21.1 
60 + 6 16.7 
 
 
Clearly, this pattern may be due to a host of factors other than fairness considerations. To 
control for these factors, we undertake a series of simple (probit) regression analyses.  
 
In table 3 we first report the results of three simple probit models. The dependent variable is 
the dummy for being willing to justify tax evasion. The main prediction from our theoretical 
model of the fairness effect is that an individual who works more should be more likely to 
justify tax evasion. To test this prediction, we include as our main explanatory variable the log 
of weekly hours worked. In model 1 we control for individual characteristics: Gender, age, 
and education. It turns out that women are less likely than men to justify tax evasion and that 
the probability of justifying tax evasion is declining with age. However, there is no significant 
effect of education on the probability of justifying tax evasion3. We find a positive, but not 
statistically significant relationship between hours worked and the probability of justifying tax 
evasion. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
To test our theoretical implications of the fairness effect, we would like to compare 
individuals who work different hours, but who earn the same. In this way we are able to 
sweep out effects of different earnings levels or marginal tax rates on the probability of 
justifying tax evasion. In model 2 we thus include the log of monthly earnings in the analysis. 
The effect of working hours now almost doubles, and is significant at a 10 percent level. The 
coefficient of 0.98 implies a marginal effect of 21 percentage points on the probability of 
justifying tax evasion of doub ling working hours, keeping monthly earnings constant.  
 
                                                 
3 Which is an interesting result given the fact that individuals with higher education are less likely to actually 
perform black market work.  
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The result of model 2 implies that if we compare two individuals with identical average 
monthly earnings (and average values of the other covariates), but where one works 10 
percent more hours than the other in order to obtain these earnings, the hard-working 
individual has 2.1 percentage points higher probability of justifying tax evasion than the less 
hard-working individual. 2.1 is about 12 percent of the average level of justification, which is 
18 percent, so the effect is economically significant as well. This experiment of comparing 
individuals who has identical monthly earnings but whose earnings arises from a different mix 
of hours and wages, is exactly what we need to test the predictions of our theory.  
 
Another possible experiment to test our theory is to compare individuals with identical hourly 
wages. Again we depart from a reference point made up by individuals with average values 
on all covariates. If we now consider the experiment of increasing working hours of one 
individual by 10 percent, keeping hourly wage constant, both working hours and monthly 
earnings increase. In this case, the probability of justifying tax evasion is 0.211*(0.9805-
0.3262)/10=1.38 percentage point higher for the hard-working individual compared to the one 
who work average hours. The positive effect of higher work effort dominates a negative effect 
of higher monthly earnings.  
 
The probability of detection 
One potential problem with this result, as mentioned earlier, is that there may be a relationship 
between reported earnings to the tax authorities, and the probability of being audited by the 
same authorities. If there is a relationship between actually performing tax evasion and the 
probability of justification, because people rationalize their behaviour, then this relationship 
may create a spurious correlation between working hours in regular employment and the 
probability of justifying tax evasion. We control for such effects in two ways. First, we report 
in model 3 results where we also include the individual’s perceived probability of being 
caught by the tax authorities, as well as the individual’s perception of other’s acceptance of 
tax evasion. We note that these variables have strong effects and considerable  explanatory 
power on our dependent variable, but that the effects of working hours is unaffected by the 
inclusion of these variables. We also include the individual’s assessment of own marginal tax 
rate. This variable does not have a significant effect. In model 4 we include a set of industry 
dummies. These are not jointly significant and the coefficients for the other variables changed 
very little when controlling for industry. Model 3 is thus our preferred specification.  
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Endogenous hours 
Since working hours is a choice variable for the individual, we undertake a simple Hausman 
type of test to check for potential endogeneity bias. In model 5 we instrument working hours 
with marital status and the presence of children in the household, interacted with gender. The 
idea is that these variables do affect the choice of working hours, but may reasonably be 
assumed to be exogenous in terms of justification. The F-value of the instruments is 6.53, 
which is acceptable, but not very impressive. We also include the residual of the first step 
regression in the model. It turns out that the residual does not have a significant effect on 
justification (conditional on the predicted working hours). We may thus conclude that 
endogeneity bias is not a significant problem in model 3. Of course, this result is dependent 
on the quality of the instruments. We have made some attempts at including industry 
indicators in the first step, but since this brings down the F-value, we do not report this. We 
also included only a few industry dummies, which produced a somewhat higher F-value. In 
both cases the residual of the first step equation turned out highly insignificant in model 5. We 
thus again resort to model 3 as our preferred specification.  
 
Actual performance of unreported work  
One may argue that this type of justification is just caused by rationalization of actual 
performance of unreported work. Actual unreported work may be correlated with working 
hours in regular work. If this is the case, what we are picking up may be a spur ious relation 
rather than a causal effect of fairness norms. To check for this, we include the answer to the 
question if the individual actually performed unreported work during the last 12 months.  The 
first column reports from the same specification as column 3 of table 3. The second column 
reports a specification where actual tax evasion is included as a covariate. The result for 
working hours changed very little, and we find a strong positive relationship between 
justification and action.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
However, actual tax evasion is obviously an endogenous variable, possibly jointly determined 
with justification. In model 3, we report from a bivariate probit model where both these 
outcomes have been jointly estimated. We report the equation for justification only. We find a 
significant and similarly sized effect of working hours on justification, and a positive 
conditional correlation between justification and action. This shows that the working hours 
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effect is not a result of a correlation between working hours and actual performance of 
unreported labour. All in all, our result fits well with the predictions from our theoretical 
model.  
 
 
5. Justification and willingness to evade taxes 
Laboratory experiments with games such as the ultimatum game and the dictator game have 
shown that people are willing to sacrifice pecuniary gains in order to avoid large deviations 
from what they consider to be fair (Camerer, 2003). When people decide whether or not they 
are willing to evade taxes, it is reasonable to assume that both economic and fairness 
considerations play a role. Consequently, a person that believes he would have a net economic 
gain from tax evasion may not be willing to evade taxes because he finds it difficult to justify 
such behaviour. Similarly, a person may choose to evade although he does not find it 
justifiable because the economic gain is high. To study the relationship between the ability to 
justify tax evasion and the willingness to evade taxes, we merge the results from our analysis 
of justifiable tax evasion with a model of economically optimal tax evasion of the types used 
in the seminal papers by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Sandmo (1981)).  
 
We assume that the decision to evade is made regularly, and that the evasion is relatively 
small, such that the potential penalty is small relative to the lifetime income. This allows us to 
analyse the tax evasion decision as if the individual is risk neutral, such that he only cares 
about the expected net income, not the degree of uncertainty4. In this respect we depart from 
the Allingham-Sandmo models.  
 
Individuals are motivated by a desire for income and leisure and by a desire to act in 
accordance with what they consider to be fair.  For our purpose, we loose no insight by using 
a utility function that is additively separable in a “selfish” and a moral part, instead of a more 
general formulation:  
 
*( , ; ) ( ; )
ut
V U y l z f l w
wl
b læ ö= - -ç ÷
è ø
  (10) 
 
                                                 
4As demonstrated by Rabin and Thaler (2001) it may lead to unreasonable results to apply risk aversion in 
choices where the stakes are small compared to life income. 
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The first term ( , ; )U y l z  is the utility derived from expected income y and labour effort l 5. 
The parameter z allows us to study differences in the relative preferences for consumption 
versus leisure between individuals. We assume that U is strictly quasi-concave in y and l. We 
denote the unreported income by u, such that ut is the tax evaded. The term 
*( )
ut
f
wl
l- captures the disutility or moral cost of deviating from what the individual 
considers to be the fair tax evasion, hereafter called the fairness effect on evasion. ' 0f >  and 
''f is assumed. The weight a person attaches to fairness considerations relative to his 
pecuniary self- interest is given by ß. The fair fraction evaded l*, as given by (7), is increasing 
in l and decreasing in w. The actual fraction evaded is given by the total evasion ut over the 
actual income wl. Hence, the deviation from the fair tax evasion is *( , ) ( , ; )
ut
l w D l u w
wl
l- º , 
where ( , ) 0lD l w <  , ( , ; ) 0uD l u w > and ( , )wD l w cannot be signed.  
 
 
The individual is supposed to pay a tax rate t on his gross income wl. If he does not, he is 
detected and penalized with probability p. The penalty tax T(u) is an increasing and convex 
function of evasion u 6. The penalty tax is always higher than the evaded tax. We assume tha t 
the probability of being detected is a decreasing, convex function of reported income, i.e. 
( )p p wl u= - where ' 0p < and '' 0p > 7 . Hence, the expected penalty is 
( ) ( ) ( , )p wl u u E u wlt- º . It follows from the assumptions about p(.) and t(.) that 0uE > , 
0uuE > , 0WE > and 0WWE > , where W wlº . The expected net income of an individual who 
evades ut is then 
 
( , ) (1 ) ( ; )y u wl t wl tu E u wl= - + -   (11) 
 
 
Maximizing V with respect to l and u, using (11), yields the two first order conditions 
                                                 
5 In this section, we can leave out subscript i for individual without causing misunderstanding. 
6 The distinction between penalizing evaded income and evaded tax does not matter for our problem as long as 
we do not discuss changes in the tax rate. 
7 The case where probability of detection depends on the reported income is discussed in Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972), but for a given total income wl. As in their paper, we do not analyse the game between evaders and tax 
authorities, such as Reingaum and Wilde (1985 and 1986) and Erard and Feinstein (1994), but simply assume 
that the taxpayers expect the probability of detection to be a decreasing function of his reported income.  
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( ; ) '( ) ( , ; )uut E u wl f D D l u wb= +               (13)
  
The right hand side of (12) is the individual’s marginal rate of substitution between income 
and leisure. The marginal rate of substitution tells us by how much the individual’s expected 
income y must be increased to compensate for one more work hour. Hence, equation (12) says 
that the required compensation for one more work hour must equal the actual compensation, 
which is the net wage rate plus the reduced expected penalty when the reported income is 
increased (for a given u). Equation (13) says that the marginal gain from one dollar evaded, 
the saved tax payment t, should equal the marginal expected penalty Eu plus the increase in 
the moral cost, '( ) ( , ; )uf D D l u wb .  
 
To be able to test if fairness considerations affect peoples’ willingness to evade taxes, we 
must be able to separate the fairness effect from other effects. We do this by analysing a 
change in the parameters z and w that does not affect the actual evasion u when fairness 
considerations play no role ( 0b = ), but that affects u when fairness considerations play a 
role. Let us compare individuals who have the same total income wl, but who may differ with 
respect to both their wage rates and their relative preferences for consumption over leisure. To 
simplify, we may think of two distinct groups, A and B, where members of group A work 
fewer hours at a higher wage rate than members of group B. The reason why members of 
group B work more hours at a lower wage is that they have a higher relative preference for 
consumption than members of group A, measured by a higher value of z. We assume that the 
higher the value of z, the lower is the marginal rate of substitution
( , ; )
( , ; )
l
y
U y l z
U y l z
- , which 
measures the increase in income necessary to compensate for one more work hour.  
 
When ß = 0, i.e. when fairness considerations play no role, equation (13) becomes  
 
( , )ut E u wl=   (13)? 
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Since the total income wl is the same for members of both groups, it follows from (13)? that 
they will evade the same amount u. Moreover, it follows from (11) that their expected net 
incomes y will be the same. As a consequence, inspection of (12) shows that members of the 
low-wage group B must have lower values of the marginal rate of substitution between 
income and leisure, 
( , ; )
( , ; )
l
y
U y l z
U y l z
- , than members of the high-wage group A. To sum up, if we 
compare individuals who have the same total labour income wl, but differ with respect to their 
wage rates and their relative preferences for consumption and leisure, we would expect no 
differences in their evasion if fairness considerations play no role.  
 
If fairness considerations play a role, i.e. if 0b > , it follows easily from (12) and (13) that 
evasion will differ between individuals when z and w differ in such a way that wl is the same. 
To see this, let us assume that u did not differ between the two groups. If both u and wl are the 
same for the two groups, it is easy to show that D must be lower for members of the low-wage 
B-group than for members of the high-wage A-group, while u
t
D
wl
= is the same for both 
groups.8  As a consequence, the right hand side of equation (13), the marginal cost of one 
dollar more unreported income, is lower for the B-group than for the A-group. It follows that 
it cannot be optimal for both groups to evade the same amount. Since members of the B-group 
have lower wages and a higher relative preference for consumption than members of the A-
group, they are treated more unfairly by the tax system. As a consequence, they are willing to 
evade more taxes.  
 
To sum up, if there is a fairness effect ( 0)b > , we would expect people who are unfairly 
treated by the tax system, i.e. those who work long hours for a low wage, to be more willing 
to evade than those who work less for a lower wage. As shown above we expect no such 
difference in the willingness to evade if there is no fairness effect ( 0)b = . Our model predicts 
that peoples willingness to evade taxes does not only depend on their total income, but also on 
                                                 
8The change in D only depends on the change in the fair tax evasion *l since *( , )
ut
D l w
wl
l= - . Since *l is 
increasing in l  and decreasing in w, D is lower for the B-group members who work long hours at a low wage 
than for the A-group who work short hours at a high wage.  
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whether this income is earned as a result of many work hours or a high wage rate. For the 
same total income, an individual who has earned his income as a result of many work hours at 
a low wage is willing to evade more than an individual who earn the same total income with a 
higher wage rate and fewer work hours.  
 
Our prediction of how fairness consideration affects the willingness to evade taxes differs 
from that of other models. While many other types of fairness arguments implies that an 
individual’s income affects his moral cost of evasion, our model is the first to suggest that it 
matters whether his income is a result of long work hours or a high wage rate. For example, 
the fairness argument of Bordignon (1993) implies that the income of an individual matters 
for his moral cost of evasion since it determines whether or not he pays too much taxes 
compared to his gain from the public expenses. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) discuss moral 
costs that depend directly on the amount evaded, such as bad conscience or social stigma. 
Also in this case, we would not expect the willingness to evade to be affected by whether the 
income is earned as a result of long hours or high wage rates.   
 
6. Empirical analysis of the willingness to evade.  
As in section 4, we test the prediction about the willingness to evade using data from the ”The 
Hidden Labour Market Survey”. We base the empirical analysis of the willingness to evade 
on the answer to the following question: 
 
If you had the possibility to take home income without reporting it to the tax authorities, 
would you have been willing to do so? 
 
In our sample of wage earners from 2003, 38 percent said ‘yes’, 28 percent said ‘no’ and 34 
percent said ‘don’t know’. In table 5 we report from a probit analysis of the probability of 
replying ‘yes’ to the above question. We find that willingness to evade taxes follows a similar 
pattern as the ability to justify tax evasion, even though significance levels vary slightly. 
Willingness declines with age and is lower for women than for men. The perceived 
probability of being caught and the beliefs about others’ acceptance of tax evasion has 
significant effects on the willingness to evade taxes. 
 
We find a positive and significant (10 percent level only) effect of log working hours, 
conditional on monthly pay. This supports the main result of the model in section 5: For the 
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same total income, an individual who has earned his income as a result of many work hours at 
a low wage is willing to evade more than an individual who earn the same total income with a 
higher wage rate and fewer work hours. Peoples willingness to evade taxes does not only 
depend on their total income, but also on whether this income is earned as a result of many 
work hours or a high wage rate.  
 
There are several caveats to the analysis of the willingness to evade taxes, the most important 
is that log working hours is endogenous in our model. There may be some heterogeneity 
component in the error term of the willingness function that is correla ted with the willingness 
to take home unreported income. In particular, the level of unreported income (u in the 
theoretical model) enters the first order condition for working hours. If there is a relation 
between the willingness to take home unreported income and actual unreported income, we 
have an endogeneity problem.  
 
Again we test for endogeneity using exogenous determinants of working hours as instruments 
for hours. The instruments are marital status and children (interacted with gender). Model 5 
report the Hausman type of test. Again we do not find significant evidence of an endogeneity 
bias in our data.  
 
The different empirical models include a host of insignificant variables. Notably, industry 
dummies and the human capital variables are not significant. This observation may appear to 
run counter to the fact observed in many other studies that industry affiliation and human 
capital variables are strong predictors of tax evasion. However, as noted by Barth and 
Ognedal (2005) the difference between the willingness to evade taxed and actual performance 
of unreported work may be due to constraints on actual performance. 
 
We conclude that fairness considerations do affect the willingness to evade taxes. Consistent 
with our theoretical model, the willingness to evade taxes is higher for those who work more 
to obtain the same level of earnings, since these are unfairly treated by the tax system. In 
particular, we show that among individuals with identical monthly wages, workers with low 
wages and long working hours have a higher probability of justifying taxes than those with 
high wages and shorter working hours.  
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7. Conclusions  
In this paper we have addressed the questions of whether or not people’s claim that they can 
justify tax evasion only is a result of rationalization or if it is genuine justification. The 
empirical analysis suggests that it is genuine justification; since people’s tendency to justify 
tax evasion is affected by the extent to which they are fairly treated by the tax system. In 
particular, we show that individuals with low wages or long working hours, both groups that 
are treated unfairly by most tax systems, have a higher probability of justifying tax evasion.  
 
Our analysis also shows that fairness considerations play a role when people decide whether 
or not they are willing to evade taxes. We show that individuals with low wages and long 
working hours, i.e., those groups who are more likely to justify tax evasion, are more willing 
to take home income without reporting it to the tax authorities. These results are consistent 
with a model in which individuals make a trade-off between economic gains and fairness 
considerations when they make decisions about tax evasion. Taken together our results 
suggest that considerations of fair income distribution are important for the analysis of tax 
evasion. 
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Table 3 The probability of justifying tax evasion    
       
       
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
       
       
log(working hours) 0,5250 0,9805z 1,1720* 1,2640* 2,0907 
  (0,3945) (0,5037) (0,5351) (0,5533) (2,5891) 
Log (monthly earnings)  -0,3262 -0,4046 -0,4387z -0,4866 
   (0,2248) (0,2558) (0,2657) (0,3415) 
Woman  -0,5119* -0,5563* -0,3362* -0,3418* -0,2586 
  (0,1458) (0,1493) (0,1613) (0,1752) (0,2677) 
Age  -0,0284* -0,0256* -0,0180* -0,0174* -0,0159z 
  (0,0068) (0,0071) (0,0076) (0,0078) (0,0095) 
Secondary education 0,0875 0,1300 0,2201 0,2311 0,2240 
  (0,2088) (0,2115) (0,2259) (0,2290) (0,2261) 
Tertiary education 0,1234 0,2454 0,4015z 0,4464* 0,4220z 
  (0,1982) (0,2163) (0,2335) (0,2505) (0,2400) 
Marginal Tax Rate   0,0058 0,0061 0,0044 
    (0,0080) (0,0082) (0,0089) 
Prob(revealed) %   -0,0177* -0,0177* -0,0178* 
    (0,0039) (0,0039) (0,0039) 
Acceptance by others   0,4940* 0,4953* 0,4905* 
    (0,1544) (0,1560) (0,1546) 
Residual log(working hours)    -0,8688 
      (2,3948) 
Industry dummies    10  
p-value     0,9906  
      6,5300 
F-value instruments first stage     
       
Pseudo R-square 0,0814 0,0856 0,1745 0,1795 0,1747 
       
N  532 532 532 532 532 
       
 
Note: * (z) significance level 5 (10) percent. j(z-mean)=0.211. In model 5 log working hours 
is instrumented by marital status and the number of children interacted with gender. The 
variable Residual log(working hours) is the residual from the first stage regression.  
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Table 4 The probability of justifying tax evasion 
     
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Probit Bivariate probit 
Log (working hours)  1,1720* 0,9962z 1,1196* 
  (0,5351) (0,5432) (0,5315) 
Log (monthly earnings)  -0,4046 -0,3327 -0,3909 
  (0,2558) (0,2591) (0,2543) 
Woman  -0,3362* -0,2759z -0,3463* 
  (0,1613) (0,1649) (0,1613) 
Age  -0,0180* -0,0174* -0,0177* 
  (0,0076) (0,0077) (0,0075) 
Secondary education  0,2201 0,2112 0,2383 
  (0,2259) (0,2317) (0,2257) 
Tertiary education  0,4015z 0,4440z 0,4089z 
  (0,2335) (0,2394) (0,2333) 
Marginal tax rate  0,0058 0,0072 0,0057 
  (0,0080) (0,0082) (0,0080) 
Prob(revealed) %  -0,0177* -0,0161* -0,0176* 
  (0,0039) (0,0039) (0,0039) 
Acceptance by others  0,4940* 0,4448* 0,4721* 
  (0,1544) (0,1568) (0,1537) 
Performed unregistered work  0,7728*  
   (0,1962)  
     
Correlation, error terms    0,4032* 
    (0,0977) 
     
Pseudo R square  0,1745 0,2050  
N  532 532 532 
 
Note: * (z) significance level 5 (10) percent. j(z-mean)=0.211. In model 3 a bivariate probit is 
run with the indicator variable: Performed unregistered work as the other endogenous variable 
(not reported). The equation for performed unregistered work also includes industry dummies 
as explanatory variables. The reported Correlation, error terms, is the estimate of the 
correlation between the error terms of the two equations.  
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Table 5 The probability of being willing to recieve unreported income   
       
       
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 
log(working hours) 0,4607 0,7632z 0,8992z 0,8095z 1,1684 
  (0,3443) (0,4375) (0,4742) (0,4895) (2,2077) 
Log (monthly earnings)  -0,2168 -0,1895 -0,0926 -0,2131 
   (0,1919) (0,2162) (0,2246) (0,2876) 
Woman  -0,4381* -0,4702* -0,2424* -0,2849z -0,2197 
  (0,1218) (0,1252) (0,1377) (0,1518) (0,2284) 
Age  -0,0196* -0,0178* -0,0069 -0,0104 -0,0064 
  (0,0058) (0,0060) (0,0066) (0,0068) (0,0081) 
Secondary education -0,2722 -0,2481 -0,2125 -0,2698 -0,2107 
  (0,1681) (0,1695) (0,1818) (0,1874) (0,1824) 
Tertiary education -0,4802* -0,3991* -0,3044 -0,3721z -0,2982 
  (0,1600) (0,1751) (0,1892) (0,2094) (0,1956) 
Marginal Tax Rate   -0,0040 -0,0016 -0,0044 
    (0,0070) (0,0072) (0,0077) 
Prob(revealed) %   -0,0171* -0,0183* -0,0171* 
    (0,0030) (0,0032) (0,0031) 
Acceptance by others   0,8085* 0,8162* 0,8076* 
    (0,1270) (0,1292) (0,1272) 
Residual log(working hours)    -0,2548 
      (2,0404) 
Industry dummies    10  
p-value     0,1333  
       
F-value instruments first stage    6,5300 
       
Pseudo R-square 0,0526 0,0551 0,1891 0,2109 0,1892 
       
N  532 532 532 532 532 
 
Note: * (z) significance level 5 (10) percent. j(z-mean)=0.365. In model 5 log working hours 
is instrumented by marital status and the number of children interacted with gender. The 
variable Residual log(working hours) is the residual from the first stage regression. 
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Table 6 The probablity of being willing to receive unreported income 
     
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Probit  Bivariate probit 
log(working hours) 0,8992 0,8245 0,9266 
  (0,4742) (0,4827) (0,4751) 
Log (monthly earnings) -0,1895 -0,1541 -0,2030 
  (0,2162) (0,2203) (0,2179) 
Woman  -0,2424 -0,1805 -0,2400 
  (0,1377) (0,1398) (0,1374) 
Age  -0,0069 -0,0061 -0,0066 
  (0,0066) (0,0066) (0,0065) 
Secondary education -0,2125 -0,2548 -0,2200 
  (0,1818) (0,1850) (0,1820) 
Tertiary education -0,3044 -0,3015 -0,3067 
  (0,1892) (0,1922) (0,1899) 
Marginal Tax Rate -0,0040 -0,0027 -0,0038 
  (0,0070) (0,0071) (0,0070) 
Prob(revealed) % -0,0171 -0,0161 -0,0173 
  (0,0030) (0,0031) (0,0030) 
Acceptance by others 0,8085 0,7897 0,8044 
  (0,1270) (0,1286) (0,1272) 
Performed unreported work  0,7854  
   (0,2074)  
Correlation error terms   0,4310 
    (0,0950) 
Pseudo R square 0,1891 0,2098  
     
N  532 532 532 
 
Note: * (z) significance level 5 (10) percent. j(z-mean)=0.365. In model 3 a bivariate probit is 
run with the indicator variable: Performed unregistered work as the other endogenous variable 
(not reported). The equation for performed unregistered work also includes industry dummies 
as explanatory variables. The reported Correlation, error terms, is the estimate of the 
correlation between the error terms of the two equations.  
 
 
  
  
